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IN THE: SUPRE:ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
i !ll t (Jf llTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
-v-
JOHN IRWIN MOON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19058 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Aggravated Robbery, a 
first-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann,, 76-6-302 
(1978) for the robbery of Smith's Food King in Payson, Utah, 
on December 18, 1982. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried with his co-defendant before a 
Jury on February 9 and 14, 1983, the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock, presiding. The jury found appellant guilty of 
Aggravated Robbery on February 14, 1983. 
made a motion for mistrial based on juror 
misconduct and prejudice. The motion was denied. Appellant 
also moved for Judgment N.O.V. based on insufficient evidence. 
111 is mot ion was also denied. 
The trial court imposed sentence on February 14, 
rlf an indeterminate term of five years to life and an 
arlrlit ional term of one year to run consecutively for use of a 
firearm in commission of the crime. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the guilty verdict in 
the court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 18, 1982 around 7 :00 p.m., four men 
robbed the smith's Food King in Payson, Utah (R. 154-156, 
217-219, 255-258). Three of the men were tall and slender; in 
the six foot range, the fourth was about five feet seven 
inches in height (R. 169, 179). One of the men grabbed the 
store manager, threatened him with a knife and forced him to 
open the safe ( R. 156, 158). Another of the men stood by the 
entrance to the store holding a double barrell bolt-action 
sawed-off shotgun and yelling for the others to hurry (R. 219, 
222, 260). He wore a brown corduroy coat with a hood, levis 
and a Halloween mask that resembled an elderly man with a big 
nose and white hair (R. 1915, 219, 243). He "seemed like he 
just towered" (R. 202). 
The other three men wore ski masks (R. 223). one of 
the masks had an orange stripe around it ( R. 223). Two of 
them wore blue ski-type parkas and another wore a green army 
fatigue coat (R. 223, 226). At least one of the men wore 
brown cotton gloves (R. 196, 198, 201). 
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One nf them emptied the cash register while the safe 
,.''" he1ng opened (R. 223). He was carrying a crowbar which he 
'";'"i to strike one of the cashiers whr:> had trouble opening her 
He jammed the money into the pockets 
,,f his hlue ski-parka and possibly into a bag (R. 209, 223, 
241, 24 3, 258, 264). The third man also carried a crowbar 
which he used to threaten a customer to encourage the manager 
to hurry in opening the safe ( R. 200). 
Joe Hanna, the store manager, testified that all but 
tree man with the knife were in the six foot range; from 5'11" 
to ii'2" (R. 182). He also stated that he was 5'7" tall 
himself (R. 179). Another witness testified that the only man 
who was short was the one who grabbed Joe whom she estimated 
was a head taller than Joe (R. 208, 212). A third witness 
stated that the two men by the safe were quite a bit taller 
than Joe (R. 233). Finally, Joe said that the man wearing the 
!Jlue ski parka and taking the money from the tills was fi feet 
or more (R. 159, 243, 258). 
After gathering approximately S2,500-S3,000 from the 
cash registers and $1,200 from the safe, the men ran out of 
the store anrl got into an orange Ford pick-up truck without 
plates (R. 167). They drove out of the store parking 
Int an.1 up the street to a parking area outsirle an apartment 
l>1Jtl•iifl<J where they parked the truck and got into two other 
""l'l' les (R. 2R4, 298). one of these was an old red or purple 
, cd .rPrj Chevy anrl the other was an old, white Chevy Impala 
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(R. 298). Both cars drove north on Highway 91 (R. 298-299), 
At about 7:39 p.m. Brent Shelby, a Highway 
Patrolman, saw a car matching the description of the maroon '" 
purple car in the northbound lane of the freeway which he 
pulled over (R. 329-331, 333). There were two men in the car 
(R. 335). The driver was appellant, John Moon (R. 335). 
Inside the car were a brown ski mask with orange on it, a 
metal pry bar, a blue ski-type parka, a rubber Halloween mask 
with an old face and white hair, a sawed-off shotgun, a gold 
or brown corduroy coat, a light-colored corduroy coat with 
blue stripes and two pairs of brown gloves (R. 337-346). In 
the pocket of the blue ski parka was a large amount of money -
$1,102.50 - approximately two fistsfull - in different 
denominations plus a roll of quarters (R. 339, 344, 367). All 
of the items except the light-colored corduroy coat and the 
cash were identified by witnesses as being or looking like the 
clothing and weapons used in the robbery (R. 162-163, 188, 
196, 197, 200-202, 215, 220, 222, 224-226, 241, 257, 258). 
The red or purple car was identified as the one seen leaving 
the apartment building after the robbery (R. 298, 368). 
Before all of the State's evidence was introduced, 
appellant's co-defendant, David Shepherd, changed his plea to 
guilty CR. 320). Later, Mr. Shepherd took the stand in 
appellant's behalf (R. 393). Shepherd testified that he was 
the robber who held the gun, the appellant was not one of the 
robbers and that his three accomplices were named Benjamin, 
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eranclt and Joe (R. 394, 398, 399, 400). According to 
5heµherd, after the robbery, he and Benjamin drove back roads 
t.• Springville taking about 10-15 minutes to return 
aµµellant's car to him (R. 400, 403, 424, 426). Shepherd said 
he never met appellant until after the robbery, when appellant 
gave Shepherd a ride in the car that Shepherd and Benjamin 
returned to appellant (R. 400). Shepherd was unable to 
provide the last names of any of his accomplices stating that 
he knew only Benjamin and Brandt prior to the robbery ( R. 395, 
39 8 ' 39 9 ' 4 08 ) • 
Appellant testified that Benjamin asked to borrow 
appellant's car to hold up a drug dealer who "burned" him (R. 
45R). He said he never knew Benjamin and never saw him, but 
that he left the car for him in a parking lot because Benjamin 
•as a friend of a friend (R, 457, 458, 459). When appellant 
picked up his car, he said Shepherd was sitting in it and rode 
with him (R. 461). Appellant stated he was travelling to Orem 
at a normal rate of speed when the police stopped him (R. 462, 
472). Shepherd never mentioned the robbery to him and 
appellant didn't look at the items that were found in the car 
IR. 4fi 2) , Appellant was supposed to receive some money or 
some "pot" for the use of his car (R. 458) but did not know 
hnw much (R. 467). Appellant also stated that he is 6 feet 3 
lnf'hes tall (R. 463). 
A criminalist from the Weber State Crime Lab 
examined several items for hair matching that of appellant 
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(R. 441, 443). He found no hair on any item that appearec1 tri 
be from appellant (R. 446). He testified that it was µossitdc 
for a person to come into contact with something and shed n<> 
hairs on it (R. 449) and that a ski mask worn for five, teri, 
or fifteen minutes might not retain hair from the wearer (R, 
452). Hair found on the brown corduroy coat and the brown anc 
orange ski mask was similar to Shepherd's hair (R. 446). 
In rebuttal, Kirk Mittelman, a police officer, 
testified that he travelled the most expeditious route from 
the offramp, where appellant was stopped, to Springville and 
then to the apartment building in Payson stopping at the 
Smith's Food King (R. 479-480). The officer travelled at 
normal rates of speed; 60 mph on the freeway and between 30-40 
mph through Payson and Springville (R. 481). No time was 
allowed for any stops along the route (R. 479). The travel 
time was 26 minutes (R. 485). 
Mittelman also drove from Smith's to the apartment 
building and then on the freeway to the point where appellant 
was arrested (R. 486). No time was allowed for stop overs anj 
a normal rate of speed was observed (R. 486-487). The total 




THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION. 
Appellant claims that the evidEnce presented at 
Ltial was insufficient to support his conviction for 
Aygravated Robbery. In cons ide ring a ch al le nge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, this 
Court has always applied the following standard of review. 
We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict is 
sufficientl · inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt • 
State v. Bingham, Utah, No. 18774, slip op. at 4 (June 13, 
1984) State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983). In State v. 
Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161 (1980), the court also stated: 
It is the defendant's burden to establish 
that the evidence was so inconclusive or 
insubstantial that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime charged. 
Id. at 1168, emphasis added. In addition, this Court 
reaffirmed its deference to conclusions reached by the jury in 
matters solely within its province: 
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It is the exclusive function of the jury 
to weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses, and it is 
not within the prerogative of the Court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the 
fact-finder. 
State v. Jolley, Utah No. 18559, slip op. at 2 (July 6, lg8;1 
quoting State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980). 
Appellant has not met his burden of establishing 
that the evidence against him was so inconclusive or 
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. He argues that, because the 
evidence was circumstantial and he offered an explanation of 
the fact that he was arrested while driving one of the cars 
used to escape from the robbery, the jury was required to 
believe his exculpatory evidence, which the state did not 
directly controvert. He further argues that none of the 
witnesses could identify him nor did they guess his exact 
height. Therefore, he urges this court to overturn the jury's 
verdict. 
That the evidence was circumstantial is not alone 
sufficient grounds for reversal. The evidence must also be 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds could not have found guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Petree, 659 P.2d at 443. The evidence in 
this case supports the jury's verdict and shows that appellant 
along with David Shepherd and two others robbed the Smith's 
Food King on December 18, 1982. 
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Witnesses said that three of the robbers were tall 
and slender-built (R. 169) and the shorter man was over 5 feet 
7 inches, possibly a "head" taller than that (R. 179, 208, 
c])J one of the taller men, wearing a blue ski parka and 
cot ton gloves, removed the money from the cash registers 
ancl stuffed it into his pocket (R. 196, 223, 243, 258). Three 
of the men wore ski masks and the fourth wore a Halloween mask 
(R. 196, 223). One man held a sawed-off shotgun and another 
carried a tire iron or crowbar (R. 222, 240). 
Appellant was discovered drivinq one of the cars 
used to escape from the scene of the robbery ( R. 298, 335) 
within 30-40 minutes of the time that the robbery began (R. 
155, 330) and within 24 minutes of the time the robbery was 
first reported to the police (R. 327). Inside the car were 
numerous items identified by witnesses as clothing and weapons 
used by the robbers (R. 337-346, 162-163, 188, 196, 197, 
200-202, 215, 220, 222, 224-225, 226, 241, 257, 258). One of 
these items was a blue ski parka with $1,102.50 in a pocket 
(R. 339, 344, 367). Also among these items were a crowbar, a 
sawed-off shotgun, a ski mask, a Halloween mask and brown 
cot ton gloves ( R. 337-346). 
Appellant and his co-defendant, David Shepherd, 
explained that these items were placed into the car by 
Shen erd and a person named Benjamin who borrowed the car from 
'l'[>ellant (R. 400, 458). Appellant claimed he did not know 
"w"J1niin or see him but that he lent Benjamin the car because 
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he was a friend of a friend (R. 457-459). He further said 
that Benjamin had the car for about 30 minutes (R. 460) and 
that it was returned to him at about 7:10-7:15 p.m. (R. 460, 
472). Appellant also claimed he did not see any of the items 
that were found in the car although he was sitting on the blue 
ski parka (R. 343, 462, 464). 
Appellant argues that the jury was required to 
believe his testimony and that of Shepherd which exculpated 
appellant. The jury is not required to believe exculpatory 
evidence presented by the defense, but may choose to discount 
it completely. State v. Garlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761, 762 
(1979); State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982). 
Appellant emphasizes that to warrant conviction, 
circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis except guilt. The evidence adduced need not, 
however, exclude everv hvpothesis, "however unsubstantial or 
incredible, which a party to such a controversy may dream up." 
State v. Tanner, Utah, 675 P.2d 539, 550 (1983); 
v. John, Utah, 586 P.2d 410 (1978). Furthermore, the jury has 
the exclusive function to weigh all of the evidence and 
determine the credibility of witnesses. State v. Jolley, No. 
18559, slip op. at 2. The jury was free, therefore, to 
conclude that the story presented by the defense was 
unbelievable. 
Appellant's explanation of the events of December 
18, 1982 is simply not believable. It is unlikely that there 
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sufficient time for appellant's car to be returned to him 
arid then driven back out onto the freeway between the time 
rh;it the robbery was reported and the time that appellant was 
''.t"['lw,-J. The total driving time between these two points is 
appruximately 26 minutes allowing no time for stop-overs and 
driving at a normal rate of speed (R. 479, 481, 485) which 
appellant and Shepherd both testified was the rate at which 
the car was driven (R. 431, 472). Even if the robbery ended 
at 7:15 p.m. when it was first reported to the police, only 24 
minutes had elapsed when appellant was seen driving along the 
freeway at 7:39 p.m. 
The better explanation is that appellant 
part ic ipa tecl in the robbery and that a short time was taken 
after the robbery in the apartments' parking area dividing the 
money. That would al low sufficient time for the 18 1/2 minute 
drive at a normal pace from the robbery to the offramp where 
appellant was stopped (R. 48f>-487). 
Appellant also asserts that the fact none of the 
witnesses was able +-o accurately estimate his exact height 
further supports his version of the facts. However, most of 
the witnesses, although there was some conflicting testimony, 
agreed that three of the four robbers were tall and at least 
i,-, the 6-foot range. The man wearing the dark blue ski parka, 
sfi mask, brown gloves and carrying a crowbar (all of which 
were- founcl in appellant's car) was described as being 6 feet 
.Jt more in height (R. 159, 243, 258). Appellant said he is 6 
-11-
feet 3 inches ( R. 463). 
Furthermore, it is not reasonable to believe that 
appellant would lend his car to a person he did not kno1o1 and 
never saw in exchange for an unspecified amount of money or 
drugs for use in a hold-up of a drug dealer. Nor is it 
reasonable that appellant would re-enter his car after it was 
used for such a purpose and not not ice the items left behind 
by the borrower, es-ecially a coat that he was sitting on or 
even a Halloween mask on the seat between appellant and his 
passenger ( R. 341, 343 ,344). 
Finally, appellant urges that none of the items 
found in the car held either his fingerprints or strands of 
his hair. This he claims is conclusive evidence that he did 
not participate in the robbery. To the contrary, however, if 
appellant was the tall man in the blue ski jacket and bro1o1n 
gloves, his fingerprints would not appear on the crowbar 
because the gloves would have prevented their transfer, 
Furthermore, appellant's own expert witness testified that a 
ski mask could be worn for up to 15 minutes without the wearer 
shedding even one hair on it (R. 452). Thus, the fact that 
none of appellant's hair was found on any of the items is not 
conclusive proof that those items were never worn by 
appellant. 
From this evidence the jury could conclude that 
appellant was guilty beyond a reasonble doubt. The evidence 
was not sufficiently inconclusive or so inherently improbable 
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1 hot reasonble minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt. 
PPtrP_e_, 659 P.2d at 443. The jury verdict should, therefore, 
be affirmed. 
POINT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL. 
After the jury retired to deliberate their verdict 
in this case appellant moved for a mistrial based on juror 
prejudice (R. 524). The motion was grounded on an alleged 
statement made by one juror to another juror that was 
overheard by Craig Snyder, an attorney who was observing the 
trial. The statement was allegedly made during a recess that 
occurred prior to the testimony of the last two or three 
witnesses but after defendant Shepherd changed his plea to 
guilty and testified in appellant's behalf (R. 525). There 
was no evidence that the statement was heard by more than the 
two jurors observed by Mr. Snyder. Nor did Mr. Snyder testify 
as to the identity of the jurors or the exact words used. The 
statement was offered by defense counsel to the court as 
follows: "Well, we only have to hear one more confession and 
then we are through." ( R. 524). 
on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court 
er1-,..,1 in denying his motion for a mistrial because the 
stdtement showed that the juror had determined appellant's 
1 he fore hearing al 1 of the evidence. Refusal to grant 
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the mistrial, he asserts, requires reversal of his conviction. 
In the context of civil trials this Court noted: 
Experience teaches that just as sure as 
human beings are involved, untoward 
happenings of various kinds will continue 
to occur during trials. It is the 
responsibility of the trial court to rule 
upon questions which arise concerning 
whether any such occurrence has prevented 
a party from having a fair trial; and to 
take whatever corrective measure [deemed] 
necessary, including the granting of a 
mistrial where that is required. 
Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121, 124 
(1965). This Court went on to say that the trial court's 
decision to deny a motion for mistrial should not be disturbed 
unless there was a clear abuse of discretion. 
Other states have applied the same standard to 
criminal trials. See, e.g. State v. Kerr, 14 wash. App. 584, 
544 P.2d 38 (1975) (Granting or denying mistrial founded on 
jury misconduct discretionary); State v. Jakeway, 558 P.2d 113 
(Kan. 1976) (no abuse of discretion in denial of mistrial 
motion where juror misconduct alleged); Sorce v. State, 497 
P.2d 902 (Nev. 1972). The Sorce court said that a trial court 
might grant a mistrial where it reasonably appears that one or 
more jurors were biased and would not engage in honest 
deliberation. Where there was nothing to indicate that a 
juror's statements had any effect on the deliberations of the 
jury, however, refusal to grant a mistrial was not an abuse of 
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J1scretion. The juror in Sorce told other jurors that she 
i 1"1uqht the defense attorneys were concerned because her 
,,;l,,1nrl s1,Jnerl the indictment upon which the defendant was 
held for trial. The juror was replaced with an alternate and 
the appellate court held that because there was no showing of 
coercion of the jury or prejudice to the defendant or that the 
statement had any effect on jury deliberations, discretion was 
n'.lt Abused. Sorce, 497 P.2d at 904. 
In the instant case it does not reasonably appear 
that the two jurors allegedly involved were so biased that 
they would not engage in honest deliberation. There is no 
evidence indicating that the statement had any effect on the 
iury's deliberations. The juror's alleged comment could be 
interpreterl to mean that the jury's services would no longer 
be neerled if the other defendant also changed his plea to 
g0ilty. It did not necessarily mean that the juror assumed 
appellant was guilty. This is especially true in light of the 
jury instructions which required the jury to base its verdict 
on the evidence adduced at trial, to weigh the evidence 
fairly, impartially and conscientiously, to decide the case 
inrliv1dually after consultation among themselves and not to 
0resume guilt based on the charge but to presum0 innocence 
,,,,,ii satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt. See, Jury 
lw,1ruc:t1nns No. 4, 10, 11, 13, 14 (R. 95, 100, 101, 103, 
111"'. lie• ause there is no evidence that the jury was 
['re1url1ced hy the alleged comment, it was not an abuse of 
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discretion to deny appellant's motion for a mistrial. The 
verdict of the jury should, therefore, be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence adduced at trial, though 
circumstantial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict was sufficient for the jury to find appellant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, appellant was not 
entitled to a mistrial because there is no evidence that the 
jury's deliberations were tainted by prejudice nor evidence 
that any of the jurors was so biased that they could not 
engage in honest deliberations. For these reasons, the 
judgment of the court below should be affirmed. 
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